MERRILL vs. BOYLSTON INSURANCE CO.

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

In the Supreme Court of Massachusetts-JanuaryTerm, 1862at Boston.
AM1BROSE MERRILL V8. BOYLSTON FIRE AND MARINE INSURANCE CO.
I. An abandonment of the voyage insured and substitution of a new voyage defeats
the policy of insurance from the time of such abandonment, although when the
loss occurs, the vessel is sailing in a track or course of the voyage common both
to the voyage described in the policy, and in the substituted voyage.
2. Such abandonment may occur after the vessel has commenced her specified
voyage.
3. The facts in the present case present a case of abandonment, and not one of
an intention to deviate, and the policy was therefore at once defeated when the
master of the ship abandoned the termini of the voyage described in the policy,
and sailed from F'almouth, bound to Antwerp, as her port of discharge.

This was an action by the assured upon a policy of insurance in
the following form,-" six thousand dollars, viz: two thousand on
freight of ship Abby Langdon, at and from Newport to Point de
Galle, and thence to Akyab. Also, four thousand dollars on freight
of said ship, at and from Akyab to port of discharge in the kingdom of Great Britain, at and after the rate of four and one-half
per cent. from Newport to Point de Galle and Akyab, and three
per cent. from Akyab to Great Britain."
The ship performed her voyage to Akyab, and while there the
master entered into a contract to take on board a cargo of rice, and
to proceed to Falmouth for orders to discharge at a port in the
United Kingdom or on the Continent, between Havre and Hamburgh
inclusive. The ship safely arrived at Falmouth, and the master
there received orders to go to Antwerp to discharge his cargo, and
in pursuance of those orders and the previous contract made by the
master, the ship sailed from Falmouth, bound for Antwerp, as her
port of discharge. While the ship was pursuing the voyage to
Antwerp by the usual track for such a voyage, on the south side
of the Isle of Wight, she was totally lost by the perils of the sea.
If the master had received orders at Falmouth to go to any port
on the east coast of Great Britain, north of the Isle of Wight, the
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ship might, without deviation, have pursued the same course which
was followed down to the time of the loss.
It was held by the court that these facts presented a case of
abandonment of the voyage insured, and that the ship in sailing
from Falmouth, bound for Antwerp, as her port of discharge, had
entered upon a new and substituted voyage, and the policy was
thereby defeated.
The case was argued by Hf. T. Painefor the plaintiff, and B. B?.
Curtis for the defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
DEWEY, J.-The question is, whether this loss happened in the

course of the voyage insured, and while the same was covered by
the policy. Certain general principles will be found to have been
settled in the adjudicated cases, which will reduce the question
now before us to a narrow compass. A well-settled distinction exists between the cases of a purposed deviation, and an abandonment of the voyage. As respects an intention to deviate, if the
loss occurs before an actual deviation, the underwriter is not discharged. An abandonment of the voyage and substitution of another and different voyage at once defeats the policy. The point of
doubt, and in reference to which there will be found a conflict of
authorities to some extent, is as to the facts necessary to constitute
an abandonment; or, in another form of stating the point, what class
of cases range under the head of an intention to deviate merely,
and thus retain the benefit of the policy, if the loss occurs before
the departure from the route common to both the port described
in the policy, and the port intended to be reached by a deviation.
In this latter class all agree that the more simple and ordinary
cases of proposed deviation, occurring under some new motive
or purpose arising after the vessel has sailed on her prescribed
course, and when the deviation was to be a temporary deviation
only, and not to defeat her voyage to the port named in the policy,
would furnish a case where the mere intent to deviate would not
affect the policy. The weight of authority seems also very clearly
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to show that a purpose existing at the commencement of the voyage to put into an intermediate port out of the course of the
voyage described in the policy, the original termini of the voyage
being still preserved, is not the substitution of a different voyage,
but only an intention to deviate: Poster vs. WJrilmer, 2 Strange,
1248; Marine Insurance Co. vs. Tucker, 3 Cranch, 357; Hobart
vs. .Norton, 8 Pickering, 160; Hare vs. Travis, 7 Barn. & Cresswell, 15; Parsons on Maritime Law, 2 vol. 306.
It will be observed that the cases held as mere intention to deviate, embraced in the last proposition, are cases where there was, at
no period, any intention to change the termini of the voyage, and
the proposed departure from the direct course of the voyage was
only to be temporary, and the vessel to resume and perfect the
voyage to the port named in the policy.
As to the abandonment of the voyage described in the policy,
and substitution of a new one, all agree that when an actual abandonment of the voyage, and substitution of a distinct voyage, has
occurred before the commencement of the voyage, the policy does
not attach or cover any loss in whatever part of the voyage it has
occurred. But as to what facts will constitute an abandonment of
the voyage, and at what period of time, in reference to the voyage,
it must be determined and acted upon, has been the subject of much
discussion and conflict of opinion.
On the one hand, it is insisted that there can be no application
of the principles applicable to abandonment, if the alteration of
the voyage and substitution of a new one occurs, at any point subsequent to the commencement of the voyage, and that all changes
of purpose as to the course of the voyage are to be treated as deviations, or intended deviations, and therefore, if the vessel is lost
before the actual deviation, such purpose, however fully settled,
does not defeat the policy.
On the other hand, it is alleged, if the ship either originally sail
on a different voyage from that described in the policy; or if, after
commencing her voyage, she entirely abandoned all intention of prosecuting it, this is a change and abandonment of the voyage, which
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avoids the policy from the moment the intention of so abandoning
is definitely formed.
To sustain the present defence, it is not necessary to adopt the
latter position in the broad terms above stated; but it is necessary
to hold that such purpose to abandon may be formed and settled
after the commencement of the voyage, and after the vessel has
arrived at a port of destination for a part of her entire voyage,
and before taking her departure from a port where she lawfully
was.
This question was very much considered in the case of Lawrence
vs. Ocean Insurance Co., reported in the 11 John. 241, and again
in Lawrence vs. Firemen's Insurance Co., 14 John. 46. The first
case arose upon a policy of insurance "from New York to Gottenburgh, and at and from thence to one port in the Baltic or Black
Sea, not south of the river Eyder." The vessel sailed from New
York, and arrived at Gottenburgh; there the port selected for the
voyage was Petersburgh, and she sailed for Petersburgh, and while
on her voyage was detained by various causes at Chalchan, and
while there changed her purpose and sailed for Stockholm. While
pursuing, however, the direct route to St. Petersburgh, and before
she came to the point of departure for Stockholm, she sustained a
loss by capture by the French.
It was held by a majority of the Supreme Court, and confirmed
by a majority of the Court of Errors, that it was the case of an
intended deviation only, and the vessel having been lost before she
had arrived at the dividing point, the insurers were liable.
The conflicting opinions held by the eminent jurists who heard
that case, leave it, as respects other tribunals, valuable for its fullness of examination and elucidation, rather than as an authority to
guide us. Thompson, C. J., in giving his reason for thus holding,
says: "No case can be found where a change of voyage, after the
commencement of the one described in the policy has attached,
has been held the substitution of a new voyage."
All the judges treat the case as a policy for a voyage to Petersburgh, that port being fixed by the selection made by the assured,
and taking her departure from Gottenburgh with that purpose.
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Mr. Justice Thompson did not deem it material whether the
voyage was to be considered as one entire voyage, commencing at
New York, or as a voyage commencing at Gottenburgh, his position being, that if commenced at either place it was a commencement of the voyage insured, and with the effect that such after
proposed and settled purpose to change the port of destination
would, until an actual deviation had occurred, be treated as a mere
intention to deviate, and would not discharge the policy.
Mr. Justice Van Ness, while he fully concedes, that where the
termini of the voyage are preserved, an unexecuted intention to
deviate does not affect the policy, affirms that when the termini are
abandoned, and a new and indefinite voyage is determined upon
and commenced, the policy ceases to have any effect. Here the
termini were not preserved, and it must, in his opinion, be treated
as an abandonment of the old voyage. He further adds: "in every
case where such change of purpose has not been held to vitiate the
policy, it will be found the terminus ad quem mentioned in the
policy was not abandoned, but the vessel intended ultimately to
proceed to it ;" and he held that it was not material as to an abandonment, whether such change in the voyage was decided and
acted upon before or after the voyage commenced.
Chancellor Kent, sitting in the Court of Errors, upon the hearing of the case of Lawrence vs. Firemen's Insurance Company,
supra, held similar views. He held that if the original plan of
destination be abandoned in order to go to another port of discharge, the voyage itself becomes changed, because the termini of
the original voyage is changed. The identity of the voyage is gone
-if the intention to abandon be once clearly and certainly established, it then becomesperfectly immaterial whether the vessel
was lost before or after she came to the dividing point, because, in
either case, she was lost not on the voyage insured, but a different
voyage. He also repudiates the distinction set up between the case
of a change of voyage, determined upon before or after the commencement of the voyage.
The case of Marine Insurance Company vs. Tucker, 3 Cranch,
857, will be found, upon examination, not to meet the present case,
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or to sanction the position taken on the part of the plaintiff. It
was a policy at and from "Kingston, in Jamaica, to Alexandria,
in Virginia." The ship originally took a cargo to deliver at Alexandria, but subsequently took freight for Baltimore, with intention
to go to Baltimore, and from thence to Alexandria; and while
prosecuting her voyage with that intent, and while on the direct
course both to Baltimore and Alexandria, and before she had
arrived at the dividing point between them, was captured, and the
court held it was only a case of intended deviation, and that the
insurers were liable.
It will be seen that in this, as well as many other cases, when
the rule of an intended deviation has been applied, that the court
place great stress upon the fact that the termini of the voyage was
not proposed to be changed.
In this case, Washington, J., says, "1the rule which we consider
firmly established by a long and uniform course of decisions, is
that if the ship sail from the port mentioned in the policy, with
the intention to go to the port also described therein, a determination to call at an intermediate port to land a cargo, is not such a
change of the voyage as to prevent the policy from attaching, but
is merely a case of deviation."
In the same case, Patterson, J., says, "from a review of the
cases, the principle is established that when the termini of-the
voyage are the same, an intention to touch at an intermediate
port, though out of the direct course, does not constitute a different voyage. In the present case the termini are the same."
The case of Kenly vs. Ryan, 2 H. Blackstone, 343, often relied upon as an authority to sustain the application of the principle of intended deviation, in distinction from abandonment, will
be found to rest upon the same ground. It was an insurance from
Granada to Liverpool.
She sailed with a settled purpose to touch at Cork. Having
been lost before she arrived at the point of deviation, it was only
an intent to deviate.
The Court say, "where the termini of the intended voyage was
really the same as those described in the policy, it was to be con-
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sidered the same voyage, and a design to deviate, not effected,
would not vitiate."
The case of Stacker vs. Harris, 3 Mass., seems to be a case
having a direct bearing upon the question. We are considering,
and particularly upon the point whether this doctrine of abandonment of a voyage can be applied to a case arising upon a purpose
thus formed wholly after the commencement of the voyage insured,
and upon a general policy authorizing sailing to and from various
ports. The insurance was from Boston to the Canaries, and at and
from thence to any ports in Spanish America, and at and from
thence to her port of discharge in the United States. The voyage
is duly commenced, the ship goes to the Canaries and from thence
to Vera Cruz. During this period the policy was in full force, but
at Vera Cruz she takes a cargo for the Havana, and on her passage
to the Havana, but while on the track, common to her proper
voyage to her port of discharge in: the United States, and before
any actual departure fro m that common track, she was captured
and lost. This Court held that the original voyage had been
abandoned, and the voyage from Vera Cruz was a distinct voyage,
and the insurers not liable for the loss, although the same happened before the vessel came to the dividing point.
The case just cited would seem decisive of the case now before
us., The rule on this subject, as stated in Arnould on Insurance, 1 Arm. 844 (350,) is that a change of voyage takes place
when either before, or after sailing, the assured abandons the
thought of proceeding to the port of destination originally prescribed by the policy, and seeks for another. " The effect of such
a change of voyage is to discharge the underwriter from all liability in the policy from the moment the purpose of changing the
voyage is distinctly formed."
"Hence if the purpose of changing the law be fixed before the
commencement of the risk, the policy is void ab initio-ifit be not
formed until after the ship has sailed, the underwriter is discharged
from all liability for losses which may occur subsequently to its
having been formed, although such loss may take place while the
ship is still on the track common both to the voyage insured and
that which is substituted for it.
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It is not necessary in sustaining the defence to the present
action to sanction the broad doctrine thus stated by Arnould, and
apparently sanctioned by Chancellor Kent and Justice Van Ness,
that a change of purpose as to the port of destination, formed while
actually on a voyage from the port described in the policy to the
port described in the policy is, from the moment it is decided upon,
to be dealt with as an abandonment of the voyage insured. This
policy of insurance contemplated, in the first instance, a voyage to
Akyab, for which a stipulated rate of premium was to be paid, and
a further voyage from Akyab to the port of discharge in the kingdom of Great Britain, at another and different rate of premiumthe first of these voyages was made under the terms of the policy.
The second commenced at Akyab. Before leaving Akyab,'or commencing the voyage, the master entered into a contract,. the performance of which required him, as the events proved, to change
his port of discharge to one out of the kingdom of Great Britain.
It is true that when the ship sailed from Akyab, it was left uncertain where the port of discharge would be, but no right of choice
on the part of the ship, but at the orders of the shipper, to be received at Falmouth. The stoppage was at Falmouth for such orders,
and at Falmouth the shipper, as he was authorized by the contract
at Akyab, selected Antwerp as the port of discharge for the'cargo,
and it is distinctly admitted "that in pursuance of those orders
and the contract of affreightment, the ship sailed from Falmouth
bound for Antwerp as her port of discharge. The ship pursued
the voyage to Antwerp by the usual track for such a voyage, and
while thus pursuing it, she accidently went ashore in a fog, on the
south side of the Isle of Wight, and was totally lost by the perils
of the sea. The track of the voyage from Akyab to the time of
the loss of ship, was one that might have been pursued without
liability for deviation, had the master received orders at Falmouth
to go to any port on the east coast of Great Britain, north of the
Isle of Wight.
It would seem to present a decided case of substitution of a new
voyage, and abandonment of that described in the policy. The
purpose so to do was fully formed, and obligations assumed in reference to it, before commencing the voyage from Akyab, at the
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election of the shipper. What was uncertain or fluctuating during
the voyage to Falmouth was at that place made certain, and every
other purpose was abandoned, and a voyage commenced from Falmouth to Antwerp, which was only defeated by the loss of the ship
by the perils of the sea-that the loss occurred on a track of a
voyage common to a port on the east coast of Great Britain, as
well as Antwerp, does none the less meake this a case of substitution of a new voyage. The termini were no longer the same.
The voyage had lost its identity, and could in no sense be called
a voyage to a port of discharge in the kingdom of Great Britain.
Upon the facts stated in this case, submitted to us, the Court are
of opinion that the original voyage was abandoned at Falmouth,
and that when the ship sailed from Falmouth bound to Antwerp
as her port of discharge, she had commenced a new voyage, and
not one covered by this policy.
Judgment for the Defendant.
The decision in the foregoing case,
so far as it proceeds on the ground
that the change of the terminus of a
voyage, during its progress, is ipso
facto an avoidance of the insurance, is
in accordance with what is stated by
Mr. Arnould, 1 Am. on Ins. 343, &c.,
2d ed., and no doubt correctly, to be
the result of the latest English authorities, and has also in its favor in this
country the great weight of Chancellor
Kent's name, 14 Johns. 67. Yet it has
against it the decision of the majority
both of the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals of New York, in Lawrence vs. Ocean Ins. Co., 11 Johns. 241 ;
14 Johns. 46; of the dicta at least of
Judge Johnson in Marine Ins. Co., of
Alexandria vs. Tucker, 3 Cranch, 357;
and of the dicta if not the decision in
Winter vs. Delaware Mutual Safety Ins.
Co., .30 Penn. St. 339. Mr. Phillips'.
opinion is also opposed to the English
view, 1 Phill. on Ins.
992. There
bering this conflict of authority on the

narrow but rather important question
which is discussed in the text with so
much acuteness and ability, itis perhaps
just and proper to re-state briefly the
argumentswhich have been supposed to
justify the opposite conclusion.
The ordinary marine policy is an undertaking to indemnify the insured
against certain kinds of losses which
may happen to a ship or its cargo or
freight, during the course of a particular voyage. This voyage is usually but
not necessarily ascertained by reference
to some designated termini. It may be,
for instance, "from Boston to Liverpool," but it may be just as well "from
the United States to Europe and a market." See Gardner vs. Col. Ins. Co., 2
Cranch, 473; Leathby vs. Hunter, 7
Bing. 517; Robertson vs. Money, 1 Ry.
& M. 75. It is all, so far, a mere matter of agreement between the parties.
But a voyage, in contemplation of law,
does not consist simply of a point of departure and a point of destination. If
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it did, a vessel might carry its insurance
round the globe, provided only the insured intended at some time or other to
bring her into the designated port. It
further includes and requires the strict
pursuance of the usual course of navigation between the points specified in the
policy, for a vessel of the kind. It
would not be of much importance to an
insurer, whether a ship from Boston
went to Liverpool or to Southampton;
but it would be whether she went to
either, in winter time, by way of Greenland, instead of by the customary route.
It is therefore settled, that if a vessel,
without reason, departs or deviates from
this usual course of navigation, it is as
much a forfeiture of her insurance as if
she changed her destination altogether.
See 1 Phillips on Ins. 989; 1 Arnould,
341. Why ? Not indeed because the
risk is increased, which perhaps could
never be absolutely ascertained, but
because the vessel is no longer on the
voyage insured: 1 Phillips, 983 ; 1 Am.
342.
So far it seems impossible to distinguish between a change in the terminus
of a voyage, and a change in the course
of its navigation. According to circumstances, the one or the other would be
most injurious. In either case it is an
effectual change in the voyage itself,
within the expressed or implied understanding of the parties, and the insurer
is entitled to say, non in hc fJodera veni.
Now, suppose during the voyage the insured entertains, and declares in the
most emphatic and decisive way, a determination to deviate from the proper
route at a particular point, say, to go to
a port several hundred miles out of the
usual course; but before that determination has been carried into effect, and
the point of departure reached, a loss
takes place. In such case, it is agreed
on all hands, that the insurer is not dis-
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charged. Foster vs. Wilmer, 2 Strange,
1249; Carter vs. Royal Exch. Co., cited
Ibid.; Thellusson vs. Ferguson, 1 Douglas, 861; Hare vs. Travis, 7 B. & Cr.
15; Marine Ins. Co. vs. Tucker, 3
Cranch, 357; Hobart vs. Norton, 8 Pick.
359; Winter vs. Delaware Mut. Safety
Ins. Co., 30 Penn. St. 339; 1 Phillips,
1001 ; 1 Am. 345. A mere intention to
do wrong, to violate the terms of a contract, is nothing. Before the wrongful
act is committed, the man may change
his mind; and he is not estopped from
repentance by his declarations alone.
Just so long as the vessel is kept on the
proper track, it matters nothing to the
insurer, what the secret or avowed designs of the insured may be.
Now, suppose in the case put, instead
of its being a change of the course of a
voyage, it is a change of its terminus
which is resolved upon; what reason can
be assigned for any difference in the
result? To the insurer there can be
practically none, for until the point of
divergence is reached, there is no increase
of risk; and after it is passed he gains
equally in either case, for in both his
liability is thereby cut short, and the premium prematurely earned. Nor, as we
have suggested, is the change of the terminus of a voyage always or necessarily
a more important thing than a change of
route. The owner of a vessel insured
from Liverpool to Albany may, for some
reason, determine, in the course of the
voyage, to make New York the port of
discharge. Here the course of the voyage, so long as it lasts, is entirely unaffected, and though there is a change
of the terminus ad guem, it is one which
enures to the advantage of the insurer,
by shortening the duration of the risk.
Can it be that this would cause an absolute forfeiture of the insurance, while
if the insured, instead of shortening his
voyage, had lengthened it, by inserting
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a parenthetical trip to Baltimore, he
would be safe until he got off the Banks
of Newfoundland? The answer to this
is succinctly given by Chief Justice
Lowrie, in Winter vs. Ins. Co., 30 Penn.
St. 339 : "It is not essential to perform
the whole voyage; the less of it the
better for the insurer."
These considerations show that the
distinction between a change of the terminus of a voyage and a change of its
course, at least as respects this particular point, is entirely artificial, and
founded in no obvious reason. And
even if it could be sustained, it would
be productive of more practical inconvenience than benefit. It would require
in every case an investigation into the
intentions and motives of the insured or
his shipmaster, during the voyage, which
would be difficult and often fruitless, for
it would go hard, if he who must be best
aware of those intentions and motives,
could not discover, when the pinch came,
that it was always his design to wind up
the deviation, by however circuitous a

course, at the original port of destination. On the other hand, that by which
alone the insurer can be really affected,
an actual deviation from the proper
course of the vessel, is a physical fact
which can be ascertained with ease, and
readily proved.
For reasons such as these, it is urged
by Mr. Phillips and others, that the doctrine of Lawrence vs. Ins. Co., above
cited, from its greater simplicity, convenience, and good sense, is to be preferred to that of the English Courts on
the subject. The arguments and authorities by which the latter is supported,
are fully and carefully stated in the
foregoing opinion of Mr. Justice Dewey,
and we shall not attempt to weaken
them by repetition. We may observe,
in conclusion, that the actual decision in
the case proceeds on a distinction which
may be considered to reconcile the authorities to some degree, and which, at
any rate, is ingenious, and forcibly sustained.
H. W.

In the Supreme Court of Errorsof Connectiut-Sept. Term, 1860.
BOWMAN VS. FOOT.

Our statutes with regard to the recovery of leased premises, except in the specific
remedy which they provide and the notice to quit prescribed, do not dispense
with the requirements of the common law on the subject.
A lease for a term of years, under which the rent was payable quarterly on certain
days named, contained the following condition:-" Provided however, that if
the lessee shall neglect to pay the rent as aforesaid, then this lease shall thereupon, by virtue of this express stipulation, expire and terminate; and the lessor
may, at any time thereafter, re-enter said premises, and the same possess as of
his former estate." Held,
1. That the terms exire and terminate were merely equivalent to the more common
expression, shall become void.
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2. That the lease, by the non-payment of rent, did not become void, but only
voidable at the option of the lessor.
3. That to take advantage of his right to avoid the lease, it was necessary for the
lessor-I st. To make demand of the rent on the day it fell due, on the premises,
and at a convenient hour before sunset. 2d. Upon neglect to pay the rent, to
make a re-entry on the premises, or in some other positive manner assert the
forfeiture of the lease.

[Per SToRRs, C. J., and HINMIAN, J.; ELLSWORTI and

SANFORD, Js., dissenting.]

Whether, after an entry for non-payment of rent, the acceptance of the rent is a
waiver of the forfeiture: Quere. The current of authorities is against such a
doctrine.

Writ of error from the judgment of a justice of the peace, upon
a summary process brought by the present defendant for the recovery of certain premises leased to the present plaintiff. The writ
of error was brought to the Superior Court, and by that Court
reserved for the advice of this Court. By the, bill of exceptions
allowed by the justice, and upon which the only questions in the
case arose, the following facts appeared.
The lease under which the defendant in the original suit held
the premises, was (so far as important to the case) as follows:
"This indenture, made by and between Enos Foot of the first
part, and William F. Bowman of the second part, witnesseth, that
the said party of the first part has leased and does hereby lease to
the said party of the second part, the house and premises known
as the Assembly House, in the city of New Haven, on the corner of
Court and Orange streets, for the term of three years from the
first day of April, 1858, for the annual rent of five hundred and
fifty dollars, payable in quarter-yearly payments of one hundred
and thirty-seven -f% dollars each, to wit: on the first days of
July, October, January and April, in each year.
"And the said party of the first part covenants with said party
of the second part, that he has good right to lease said premises
in manner aforesaid, and that he will suffer and permit said party
of the second part, (he keeping all the covenants on his part, as
hereinafter contained,) to occupy, possess, and enjoy said premises
during the term aforesaid, without hindrance or molestation from
him or any person claiming by, from, or under him.
23

BOWMAN vs. FOOT.

"And the said party of the second part covenants with the said
party of the first part to hire said premises, and to pay the rent
therefor, as aforesaid.
*
*
*
*
*
"Provided towever, and it is further agreed, that if said party
of the second part shall neglect to pay the rent as aforesaid. * * *
then this lease shall thereupon, by virtue of this express stipulation therein, expire and terminate, and the party of the first part
may, at any time thereafter, re-enter said premises, and the same
have and possess as of his former estate.
"cAnd it is further agreed between the parties hereto, that whenever this lease shall terminate, either by lapse of time or by virtue
of any of the express stipulations therein, that said lessee hereby
waives all right to any notice to quit possession, as prescribed by
the statute relating to summary process.
*
*
*
"And this agreement in writing is, at all times during the
period the lessee shall occupy said premises, to be referred to as
evidence of the conditions, stipulations, and agreements under
which he occupies the same."
It was found by the court that there was due to the plaintiff from
the defendant, as rent under the lease, on the first day of April,
1859, the sum of $187.50, and that the defendant did not, in fact,
pay this sum on that day. On this point the court found more particularly, that, on the first day of April the plaintiff had an interview
with the defendant, in which the parties conversed about the rent
and about the payment of a certain note for $400, then due from
the defendant to the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff did not then, in
fact, waive the payment of the rent at that time, or excuse the
defendant from the immediate payment thereof, but that the defendant understood the plaintiff in that conversation expressly to excuse
him from such immediate payment, and to consent that he might pay
the rent at a subsequent day; and the Court found that, in consequence of such understanding, the defendant omitted to pay the
rent on that day. The Court further found that, on the 4th day
of April, 1859, and before suit was brought, the defendant tendered to the plaintiff, as rent, the sum of $150, and that the plaintiff accepted it as rent to April first, and gave a receipt therefor
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on account, but that the plaintiff, in accepting it, did not expressly
waive any right which he then had (if he then had any) to prosecute and maintain his suit, but, on the contrary, then expressly
declared that he did not waive any such right.
The plaintiff claimed. upon the facts so found by the court, that
the law was so that the defendant had, within the legal intent and
meaning of the lease, "neglected" to pay the rent on the first day
of April, and that, consequently, the lease did on the same day
expire and terminate; but the defendant-contended that upon the
facts the law was so, that he did not, within such legal intent and
meaning, "neglect" to pay the rent. Upon this question of law
the court sustained the claim of the plaintiff, and held that, upon
the facts so found, the defendant had "neglected" to pay the rent,
and that consequently the lease did, on the 1st day of April, 1859,
expire and terminate.
The plaintiff in error assigned as errors-lst. That the justice
held that the right to insist on the forfeiture for non-payment of
the rent due on the 1st of April, 1859, had not been waived by the
subsecluent acceptance of the rent on the 4th of April, 1859; and
2d. That the justice held that the lease was determined on the 1st
of April, 1859, by the non-payment of the rent due on that day,
when no demand had been made for the rent.
Doolittle and Bronson, for the plaintiff in error.
.R. Ingersoll, for defendant.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
STORRS, C. J.-We do not find it necessary to decide whether,
by the acceptance of rent which fell due before the alleged determination of the lease, the lessor waived his right to repossess himself of his estate. The current of authority is against such a
doctrine, although the opposite view of the law is not wholly unsupported. Coon vs. Brickett, 2 N. Hamp. 163. It is generally
maintained that an entry for condition broken ought not at all to
affect the right to receive payment of a pre-existing debt, or the
acceptance of payment of such a debt to affect the right of entry.
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Nor do we determine whether the effect of such an acceptance
can be qualified by a landlord's declaration, at the time of the
acceptance, that he does not thereby mean to waive any right.
High authority sanctions the idea that the acceptance of rent
accruing after condition broken, is in law a waiver of the forfeiture,
and not evidence of such waiver merely. It has also been said by
judges of great eminence, that the right of the party who pays
money to control its application, constrains the lessor who receives
rent, tendered as such, to waive his claim of forfeiture.
The only point which we propose to settle as the law of the
present case, is that upon the facts stated there was no legal
determination of the lessee's estate.
Our statute of summary process recognises no other termination
of leases than such as is effected by force of the contract itself. It
supersedes none of the common law remedies of the landlord,
except in respect of the notice to quit and the form -of procedure
by action. It follows, that the question whether the tenant's rights
have ceased must be settled according to a common law interpretation of the instrument of demise. In some States, precise legal
consequences are annexed by statute to the non-payment of rent,
and the lessee is arbitrarily divested of his estate. Our statutes
contain no such provision.
The lease in evidence was for three years, ending on the first
day of April, 1861. It contained a covenant of quiet enjoyment for
the full term, with a qualification thus expressed :-" he [the lessee]
keeping all the covenants on his part." One of these covenants
was for the payment of a quarterly rent upon certain quarter days
named. In a subsequent part of the instrument is a proviso of the
following tenor: "Provided, however, that if the lessee neglects to
pay the rent, &c., then this lease shall thereupon, by virtue of this
express stipulation therein, expire and terminate, and the party of
the first part may, at any time thereafter, re-enter said premises,
and the same have and possess as of his former estate." Again,
the parties agree that so long as the lessee's occupation continues,
(referring to a holding over by consent,) the written agreement shall
be evidence "of the conditiona, stipulations and agreements under
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which he occupies." It will be observed that the draughtsman of
the contract designs to make use of technical language; and we
have, in the first place, the clearest expression of a condition
annexed to the covenant for the tenant's peaceable enjoyment of
estate. Next, we have the correct commencement of a condition
-c provided however"-in the very stipulation which is said to
terminate the lease, and we have, at the close of the stipulation, a
re-entry clause-the apt formula to indicate how a forfeiture is
to be, enforced: Best, C. J., in Willson -vs. Phillips, 2 Bing. 13.
Last of all, we have an explicit reference to the "conditions" of
the instrument by that very name. It was the clear intent of the
parties, whatever they may have supposed to be the legal consequences in detail of such a stipulation, to attach to the demise a
condition for the lessor's benefit, upon the breach of which he was
authorized to compel the tenant to submit to a forfeiture of his
tenancy.
The legal interpretation of the instrument agrees with this manifest intent. There is no peculiar significance to the words "shall
expire and terminate." They mean just as much, and just as little,
as would the more common phrase, "1shall become void," if inserted
at the same place. Indeed, it appears that both terms were employed together in a lease, the construction of which was the subject of determination in the case of Jacksonvs. Harrison,17 Johns.
66. It was there provided, that in case the rent should not be
paid "it should be lawful for the lessor to re-enter," &c., and that
" the lease and estate thereby granted should cease, determine, and
become utterly void, if the lessor should elect so to consider it."
It is well understood, that such expressions as these in leases for
years do not designate the non-payment of rent as an event, like a
death or a marriage, at the date of which an estate shall cease at
all events. If so, it would be in the power of the tenant, whenever
his leasehold property became unprofitable or onerous, to relieve
himself at any pay-day of his duty to retain it, by simply violating
his own covenants. Such a construction would be a plain perversion of the intent of the parties. Accordingly, such stipulations are
now universally taken to be for the advantage of the landlord.
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"Void" means "voidable at his election :" Jones vs. Carter, 15
Mees. & Wels. 718. "Expire and terminate" is also an elliptical
phrase, meaning "expire and terminate at the lessor's option."
This principle of construction leaves us nothing to do with a distinction, which is said to prevail between freehold interests and
leases for years, requiring in one case, and not requiring in the
other, an entry or claim to divest an estate wholly. void by the
breach of a condition. In cases like the present, the estate is not
wholly void by reason of a breach. Its avoidance is contipgent
upon the acts of the reversioner. Compare Shep. Touch., pages
139 and 184; see, also, Doe vs. Bancks, 4 B. & Ald. 401. To
ascertain the law of the case in hand we must fill up the ellipsis.
The lease is to expire and terminate after non-payment, at the
option of the lessor, who may then re-enter and annul the tenancy.
This rendering of the contract makes the duration of the lease
contingent on the exercise by the lessor of his right to terminate
it.
To denote how this is to be done, the instrument, fairly read,
implies that a re-entry shall take place; the usual technical mode
prescribed in such contracts, indicating, in the case of estates less
than freehold, not necessarily a literal entry, but some proceeding
that should in a significant and decisive manner declare the forfeiture of the lease and assert the landlord's rights.
If a tenant's right is thus voidable only, the option to avoid must
be exercised under the contract and according to legal usage. The
re-entry clause, at all events, creates a necessity for some positive
act of the landlord, toLdetermine his tenant's estate. In construing
a lease which authorized the lessor, upon the lessee's neglect to perform his covenants, to enter without further demand and notice,
and to dispossess the latter, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts
held that, inasmuch as a condition and not a limitation was created
by the words employed, the estate of the tenant was not avoided by
the neglect, and could only be terminated by re-entry: Fifty Associates vs. Howland, 11 Met. 99. Since the present case was decided, we have learned that this doctrine was involved in a decision
of the Queen's Bench, Bishop vs. Trustees of Bedford Clharity, 28
L. Jour. 215, which was afterwards reviewed in the Exchequer
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Chamber. The doctrine itself does not appear to have been disputed. The defendants, owners of certain premises, were charged
with being also in possession of them, and therefore liable for an
injury suffered through their negligent condition. They had been
leased for thirty years, subject to a right of re-entry for the nonpayment of rent. The lessee failed to pay, went into bankruptcy,
and left the occupancy of the premises to his weekly lodgers, who,
as such, had of course no estate in them. From these persons the
defendants, before the accident, had collected rent, and after it,
by a decree of the Court of Insolvency, obtained a surrender of
the lease itself. To establish possession in the defendants, the
judges of the Exchequer Chamber held that it must appear that
they had by re-entry avoided their tenant's lease; that the receipt
of rent from the weekly lodgers was no proof of re-entry, as it was
consistent with the continued existence of the lessee's tenancy;
and that, as no demand was proved, the defendants had not asserted in fact their rights under the re-entry clause, and therefore
could not be said to be in possession of their property at the time
of the injury.
Where a lease is thus voidable, the landlord's option to avoid it
should be exercised at the proper point of time, and in the proper
place; and, above all, should be brought home to the tenant's
knowledge through some unequivocal act, in order to certify to
him that he is absolved from the further performance of a lessee's
duties. "Where," to quote Baron Parke, "the terms of a lease
provide that it shall be avoided by re-entry either in the case of
a freehold lease or a chattel interest, an entry, or what is tantamount thereto, is indispensable."
Assuming, then, that it devolves on the lessor to take active
measures to enforce his right of avoidance, we cannot doubt that
no such forfeiture should be suffered, as for a breach of duty,
unless the performance of the duty is first demanded or requested.
This principle is illustrated in a striking manner by the case of
.Bferrifield vs. (Jobleigk, 4 Cush. 182, where the controversy related
to a freehold estate. "Whenever," so ran the covenant, "the
grantee shall neglect or refuse to support" a certain fence, "this
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deed shall be void." The court held that, until there was a demand upon the grantee to repair the decayed fence, there was no
breach of the condition. Yet literally, at the point of time when
the grantee passively neglected that duty, his title failed. In the
case before us no demand was made for the rent. The conversation of April 1st, 1859, however it was or ought to have been
understood, is not claimed to have amounted, even by implication,
to such a demand.
To prevent future litigation, and to enable parties to make contracts adapted to the view which we take of the law, we go a step
beyond the requirements of the case to speak of the formalities
necessary to terminate a lease voidable on the non-payment of
rent. We confess that we know of no new rules with which to
instruct our judgment in this matter, and naturally adhere to the
settled doctrines of the common law.
The case of Jackson vs: Harrisonwas decided by h learned court,
and has not been overruled by any of the higher tribunals of the
State of New York. The lease in question was for seven years,
and provided, as has been stated, for an avoidance and re-entry
upon non-payment of rent. The court held that an entry was
essential to the forfeiture claimed, and that none could be made
without showing a demand of the rent due, upon the last day of
payment, on the premises, and at a convenient hour before sunset.
"The plaintiff," says Van Ness, J., "1equally fails in showing a
right of entry, by reason that the defendant did not pay the United
States tax, because 4e indispensably necessary step of making
a demand of the defendant within the period required by law in
order to create a forfeiture, was not taken." This decision seems
to be a true exposition of the common law.
A late New Hampshire case, MeQuesten vs. Morgan, 84 N.
Hamp. 400, in its result, accords with our present conclusion, and
involves facts of the same general character.
There is error in the proceedings of the magistrate, and we
advise that his judgment be reversed.
In this opinion HINMAN, J., concurred.
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ELTSWORTH and SANFORD, Js., were of opinion that our statutes

respecting leases had done away with the technical rules of the
common law as to getting possession of leased premises, and dissented from the opinion of the Chief Justice.
Judgment reversed.
(1) It has been in general held that
the receipt of rent accruing after a
breach of covenant by a tenant, which
by the provisions of his lease creates a
forfeiture of the term, is a waiver by the
landlord of his right of re-entry, if he
was at the time aware of the forfeiture,
but otherwise not, because the act is an
affirmance of the existence of the tenancy,
and an election by the landlord to treat
the lease as still subsisting. Jackson vs.
Brownson, 7 Johnson, 227; Camp vs.
Pulver, 5 Barbour, 91; Clarke vs. Cummings, Id. 339 ; Koeler vs. Davis, 5 Duer,
507: Jackson vs. Sheldon, 5 Cowen, 448;
McKeldore vs. Darracott, 13 Gratt. 278;
Dendy vs. Nicholl, 4 C. B., N. S. 376;
Price vs. Werwood, 4 Hurls. &Norm. 511.
In Croft vs. Lumley, 5 Ell. & Bl. 648; 6
H. Lds. Cases, 672; Ell., El. & Eli. 1069,
Am. ed., the question was much discussed. There a lessee tendered rent
which had accrued subsequently to
breaches of covenant, as rent, but the
lessor took it as compensation for occupation, expressly reserving the right of
re-entry; it was held by the Queen's
Bench to be nevertheless a waiver of the
forfeiture. The judgment was affirmed
in the Exchequer Chamber, and in the
House of Lords on another ground. But
in the latter tribunal it was held by a
majority of the Judges consulted, Crompton, J., dissenting, that by force of the
maxim solutio accipiturin modum solventis,
the receipt. of the rent operated as a
waiver of the forfeiture in respect to such
breaches as were known at the time.
Erle, J., went farther, and held it to be
a waiver also as respects even unknown

breaches, which did not differ in circumstances from those which were known;
and Watson, B., held it to be a waiver
of all previous breaches. On the other
hand, it was the opinion of Crompton, J.,
that the receipt of the rent was not necessarily a waiver, but that the question
was, whether it was in fact received with
the intention to waive the forfeiture, and
in this Lord Wensleydale appeared to
agree.
For the converse reason, the mere receipt of rent due before the forfeiture,
will not be a waiver. Jackson vs. Allen,
3 Cow. 220; Hunter vs. Ousterhouldt, 11
Barbour, 33; Stuyvesant vs. Davis, 9
Paige, 427; Bleeker vs. Smith, 13 Wend.
533; though the opposite was held in
Coon vs. Bricket, 2 New Hamp. 163.
Nor even if after a forfeiture will it operate to relieve from the consequences of
subsequent continuance of the original
forfeiture. Jackson vs. Allen, 3 Cowen,
220; Bleeckef vs. Smith, 13 Wend. 533.
But where the landlord distrainsfor rent
due before the forfeiture, with the knowledge of it, it will be a waiver; because
that is an act which could only be lawfully done during the continuance of the
tenancy. Jackson vs. Sheldon, 5 Bowen,
448; Stuyvesant vs. Dtivis, 9 Paige, 427;
but see MeKeldore vs. Darracott, 13
Grattan, 278. On the other hand, after the
landlord has taken steps by ejectment to
enforce his right of entry, he cannot obtain any relief in equity or at law, which
would assume the existence of the tenancy, as by an injunction to prevent the
collection of rent by the tenant from
sub-tenants; Stuyvesant vs. Davis. 9
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Paige, 427; or an action to compel the
payment of subsequent rent or the performance of the covenants of the lease.
Jones vs. Carter, 15 L & W. 718.
(2) There is no doubt, as is stated in
the foregoing opinion, that weight of authority is that, under the usual clause
of forfeiture, the breach of a condition
in a lease does not make it absolutely
void, but only voidable at the election
of the landlord; and that re-entry, or
what is equivalent thereto, must be
resorted to by him, to enforce the election. In addition to the cases cited in
the foregoing opinion, Doe vs. Banks, 4
B. & A. 401 ; Rde vs. Farr, 6 M. & S.
121; Doe vs. Meux, 4 B. & C. 606; Doe
vs. Birch, 1 M. & W. 406; Doe vs. Lewis,
5 A. & E. 277; Clarke vs. Jones, 1 Denio,
677; Phillips vs. Chesson, 12 Ired. 194.
But in Pennsylvania, this appears sot
to be the law; and the breach of condition is held to avoid the lease absolutely: Kenrick vs. Smith, 7 Watts &
Serg. 47 ; Shaeffer vs. Shaeffer, 1 Wright,
627; Davis vs. Moss, 2 Id. 346. But it
deserves notice, that the question did
not distinctly arise in either of these
cases. The first was substantially that
of a vendee under articles, so that the
landlord had still the legal title. In the
second he had present possession for a
limited estate; and the third was that
of a mining lease, in which the landlord

had a general possession of the land.
subject to the mining right.
(3) The established rule at common
law has always been, that where a right
of re-entry is claimed on the ground of a
forfeiture for non-payment of rent, there
must be proof of a demand of the precise
sum due, on the most notorious part of
the demised premises, .at a convenient
time before sunset on the day when the
rent is due. Co. Litt. 202 a; I Williams
& Saunders, 287; Clun's Case, 10 Rep.
129 a; Cropp vs. Hambleton, Co., Eliz.
48; Wood & Chevor's Case, 4 Leonard,
180; Tinkler vs. Prentice, 4 Taunt. 549;
Acocks vs. Phillips, 5 Hurlst. & Norm.
183; and this has been generally followed
in the United States. Conner vs. Bradley, 1 How. U. S. 217; 17 Pet. 267;
Jackson vs. Harrison, 17 Johns. 70;
Remsen vs. Concklin, 18 Id. 450; Jackson vs. Kepp, 8 Wend. 280; Van Rensselaer vs. Jewell, 2 Comst. 147; McCormick vs. Connell, 6 Serg. & R. 153;
Stover vs. Whitman, 6 Binn. 419 ; Gage
vs. Smith, 14 Maine, 466; James vs.
Reed, 15 New Hamp. 68; Jewett vs. Berry, 20 Id. 46; McQuester vs. Mergher,
34 Id. 400; Chapman vs. Wright, 20
Illinois, 120; Eichart vs. Bargus, 12 B.
Monroe, 464; Mackuben vs. Whitecraft,
4 Harr. & John. 135; Yale vs. Crewson,
6 Ind. 65; Phillips vs. Doe, 3 Ind. 132;
Gaskill vs. Trainer, 3 Calif. 334.
H. W.
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CHESTER M. FOSTER ET AL. VS. DENIS JULIEN, APPELLANT.
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1. A. made his promissory note in the city of New York, pa'yable generally. He
resided at the time in New York, as well as the endorser. Before the note fell
due, he removed to New Jersey, where he resided at its maturity. Held, that it
was not necessary for the holder, in order to charge the endorser, to present the
note for payment at the maker's former place of residence in New York.
1 We are indebted to the courtesy of Judge Davies for the following opinion, for

-which he will accept our thanks.-Ens. A. L. REG.
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2. The cases of Anderson vs. Drake, 14 Johnson, 114, and Taylor vs. Snyder, 3
Denio, 145, commented upon, and the case of Wheeler vs. Field, 6 Metcalf, 290,
overruled.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by
DAVIES, J.-This is an action upon a promissory note, made by
one George Varden, payable to the order of the defendant, and by
him indorsed. The note was dated at New York, where the maker
resided at the time, and the indorser resided in the same city. The
note was dated May 3d, 1855, and had three months to run. About
the middle of June following, the maker removed to the State of
New Jersey, and continued to reside there until Sept. 24, 1855.
The note fell due August 6th, and was protested, and notice of
protest duly given to the defendant. From the facts found, it
appears that the notary, on the day the note fell due, made inquiries for the maker at the Post Office in the City of New York,
and, to ascertain his residence, examined the City Directory, but
the maker's residence, on such inquiry, could not be found. The
Judge, upon those facts, found, as a question of law, that the
removal of the maker from the State of New York into the State
of New Jersey, and his continued residence there up to the maturity of the note, dispensed with the necessity of the demand upon
him. The judgment was affirmed at the General Term, and the
defendant appeals to this Court.
The only question presented for consideration is, whether the
change of residence of the maker, from the State of New York to
the State of New Jersey, intermediate the date of the note and
its maturity, dispensed with the necessity of presenting the note at
the last place of residence of the maker in this State, and demanding payment thereof there. It is not contended that .the holder was
bound to seek out the maker or his place of residence in the State
to which he had removed, for the purpose of presenting the note
and demanding payment. But it is urged that the holder should
have sought the last place of residence of the maker in this State,
and made the presentation and demand there. The Supreme Court
of this State in Anderson vs. Drake, 14 Johns. 114, say they had
then (in 1817,) in a late case not reported, decided, when the
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drawer of a note had removed to Canada, the note being dated and
drawn in Albany, though not made payable at any particular place
in that city, that a demand in Albany was sufficient to charge the
indorser. It is not stated where the demand in that case was made
in Albany, and it is not seen, upon the facts stated, how it could
have been made, nor is any reason given for making it. It was
decided in Anderson vs. -Drake,supra, that when a note is not
made payable at any particular place, and the maker has a known
and permanent residence within the State, the holder is bound to
make a demand at such residence in order to charge the indorser.
The general rule is, that the holder of a note -who seeks to charge
the indorser, must demand payment of the note, at its maturity,
of the maker, at his place of business or residence. If the note is
payable at a particular place, the demand must be made at the
appointed place. The holder must use all reasonable and proper
diligence to find the maker, when no particular place of payment
is appointed in the note. And the case of Anderson ,vs. Drake,
supra, established the rule, that when a change of-residence of the
maker took place between the making of the note andits maturity,
and no place was appointed in the note for its payment, the demand
of payment must be made of the maker at his place of residence at
the maturity of the note, provided such residence was within this
State. Taylor vs. Snyder, 3 Denio, 145, was an action upon a note
dated at Troy, in this State, tke maker residing in Florida at the
time of making the note, and at its maturity. No intermediate
change of residence took place. The payment of the note was
demanded of the defendant, the indorser thereon, at Troy, and on
refusal, was protested, and notice given. Beardsley, J., reviews,
ably and elaborately, all the cases where the presentment of the note
for payment has been excused, and classifies the exceptions to the
general rule, requiring presentment and demand to charge the indorser, and shows they all rest on peculiar reasons. He says: "In
one, the maker has absconded; in another, he is temporarily absent,
and has no domicil or place of business within the State; in a third,
his residence, if any, cannot be ascertained; while in the fourth, he
has removed out of the State, and taken up his residence in another
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country. In each of these instances, let it be observed, the fact
constituting the excuse occurs subsequently to the making and
indorsement of the note, and it is this new and changed cohndition
of the maker, and that only, by which the indorser stands committed without a regular demand."
In MeGurdee vs. Bank of Washington, 9 Wheaton, 598, the
Supreme Court of the United States say, in reference to change of
residence to a foreign country, or to another State, "that reason
and convenience are in favor of sustaining the doctrine that such a
removal is an excuse from actual demand. Precision and certainty
are often of more importance to the rules of law than their abstract
justice ; on this point there is no other rule that can be laid down
which will not have too much latitude as to place and distance.
Besides which, it is consistent with analogy to other cases, that the
indorser should stand committed in this respect by the conduct of
the maker. For his absconding, or removal out of the kingdom,
the indorser is held, in England, to stand committed."
It is thus seen that the controlling element, which is introduced
to establish the indorser's liability, is the change of condition after
the making of the note. It is this change which commits the indorser, and excuses the presentment and demand of the note; and in
this State the rule has been regarded as well settled, since the decision of the case of Anderson vs. Drake, that a removal of the
maker after the making of the note and before its maturity, out of
the State, excuses the holder from presentment and demand. It is
true that the court say that in the case of the removal of the maker
of the note to Canada, intermediate its making and maturity, where
the note was dated at Albany, a demand in Albany was held sufficient to charge the indorser, yet it is not stated where the demand
in Albany in that case was made, or if the court deemed the fact
of a demand essential. The principle of the cases was, that the
removal of the maker excused presentment and demand, and the
Canada case was decided in harmony with that principle, and it
was not necessary to the case, or to render the decision in conformity with the previous cases, to advert to the fact that a demand of
payment of the note (if any was made) was made in Albany. It
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was not relied on, or adverted to, that such demand was made at
any particular place, and no reason is suggested why it should have
been made at all, or that its being made was regarded as a material circumstance. The Canada case is certainly no authority for
the position of the defendant, that the demand should have been
made at the last place of business or residence of the maker in
this State. Beardsley, J., in Taylor vs. Snyder, supra, says, "that
there is a further exception to the rule requiring a demand to be
made of the maker, or at his domicil, or his place of business, for
where a note is made by a resident of the State, who, before it is
payable, removes from the State and takes up a permanent residence elsewhere, the holder need not follow him to make demand,
but it is sufficient to present the note for payment at the former place
of residence of the maker."
I have looked at all the authorities referred to in support of this
position, and they fail entirely to sustain the point in.terms stated,
and furnish no authority for the qualification that it is sufficient to
present the note for payment at the former place of business of the
maker. The learned judge was misled by the head-note to the case
in 9th Wheaton, supra,which is in these words: "When the maker
of the note has removed into another State or another jurisdiction,
subsequent to the making of the note, a personal demand on him is
not necessary to charge the indorser; but it is sufficient to present
the note at the former place of residence of the maker."
There is nothing in the case to warrant the qualifications or suggestions in the head-note relative to presenting the note at the
former place of residence of the maker. It has long been well
settled that a personal presentment of the note to the maker is not
necessary to charge the indorser, neither will the presentment alone
of the note suffice to charge the indorser; there must be a demand
of payment, and refusal; but no case which I have met with requires
that the presentment and demand should be personal to and of the
maker. A demand of payment at the place of business, or residence of the maker, was sufficient, and a refusal by any one there
was all that was required. In Cromwell vs. Hynson, 2 Esp. 511, it
was held that the presentation of a bill to the wife, at the party's
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house, he being a master of a ship, and absent from England, was
a sufficient demand. (See, also, 2 Taunton, 206.) The facts as
admitted in M' aruder vs. Bank of Washington, supra, were that
at the maturity of the note neither the holder or the notary knew
of the removal, from the District of Columbia, of the maker who
resided there at the date of the note; that ten days before its
maturity he removed out of the District to the State of Maryland,
nine miles distance from his previous residence. At its maturity the
note was delivered to a notary, who went with it to the house of the
maker, where he had resided, and from which he had removed, in
order there to present the note and demand payment; and not finding him there, and being ignorant of his place of residence, returned
the said note under protest. Now, it is not alleged that the notary
presented the note at the last place of residence of the maker, in
the District, or that he demanded payment of it from any body,
and the court, in its opinion, does not advert to the fact that the
notary went with the note to the maker's last place of residence, or
intimate that he should have done so, and there presented it and
demanded payment; but the court distinctly places its decision
upon the fact that the removal of the maker, after the date of the
note, and before its maturity, out of the District into one of the
States, being in another jurisdiction, absolved the holder from the
necessity of presentation and demand of payment, and held the
indorser duly charged, though neither was done. The court gave
no intimation that the note had been presented at the maker's last
place of residence, or that that fact was regarded as at all material.
The next case referred to by Justice Beardsley is that of Anderson vs." Drake, supra, in which no such point arose or is referred to.
The only allusion to it is the remark made relative to the Canada
case, where it was said it was held that a demand in Albany was
sufficient to charge the indorser. Dennie vs. Walker, N. Hamp.
199, did not present the point; but so far as it bears on the present
case, is an authority to sustain the judgment in this case. There
the maker of a note resided in Portsmouth, at the date of the note,
but at its maturity was at sea, his family still residing there, and
there had been no change of his residence. The court held that
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his absence did not excuse presentment and demand at his residence to charge the indorser. 'Upham, J., says: -"A removal
without the bounds of the government, after the making of a note
and before it becomes due, and where no place of payment of the
note is specified, render a demand upon the maker unnecessary;
but this is an exception to the general rule, and must be construed
strictly. Anything less than an actual change of residence by
removal without the State, would leave the rule too uncertain."
The next case is that of G-illespie vs. 1Iannahan,4 M'Cord, Rep.
503. Here the notary made inquiry for the maker of the note in
Charleston, where it was dated, and where the maker resided at the
time it was made, but who had no residence at its maturity in
Charleston, having in the meanwhile removed to Philadelphia. The
notary protested the note, and gave notice to the indorser without
having made any presentment or demand. In an action against the
indorser, the court held that when the maker has remoyed to another
State, and resided there at the maturity of the note, demand of
payment was not necessary. The court says: "For all legal purposes a neighboring State is regarded as a foreign country. Bills
drawn on a sister State are regarded as foreign bills, and the
terms 'beyond the seas,' used in the statute of limitations, have,
in construction, been applied to a neighboring State, and I come
to the conclusion that, for the purposes of a demand on the maker
of a promissory note, it must be so regarded, and that his absence
from the State in which the note was made, and where it was understood it was to be paid, will excuse the holder from making a
personal demand, in order to charge the indorser."
.Reidvs. Morrison, 2 Watts & Sergt. 401, I regard as an authority in point. There the court held, that if the drawer of a bill or
maker of a note has absconded, that circuistance will dispense with
the necessity of making any further inquiry after him, citing Chitty
on Bills, 261; Bayley on Bills, 95. In Duncan vs. MCullough,
4 Sergt. & Rawle, 480, the court say, "the same rule which
exists in the case of absconding applies to that of the removal
of the maker or drawer into another jurisdiction after the execution of the instrument." Gist vs. Lybrand, 3 Ohio, 307,
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is also a case in point. It was urged there that no inquiry was
made at the last place of residence of the maker for payment, he
having intermediate the date of the note and its maturity, removed
feom the State. The court say, "we all concur in opinion with the
Supreme Court of the United States upon the first point in this
case. In the case of l Grudervs. Bank of Washington, cited by
the plaintiff's counsel, they have settled that the removal of a
maker of a note, after it was made and before its maturity, into a
different State from where he resided when the note was made,
excuses the holder from making actual demand of payment from
the maker. Whether the demand should be made at any other
place is not made a point or adjudicated upon in that case. But
it seems to us a clear consequence of the decision that such demand was unnecessary. The fact of removal commits the indorser
and dispenses with the demand, unless a particular place be appointed for the payment of the note in the note itself."
I entirely concur in tke views thus clearly expressed by the Supreme Court of Ohio. I think they correctly apprehended the exact
force and extent of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States, and that case should be followed as an authority. There
would have been no misapprehension in reference to that case, if the
head-note of the reporter had not interpolated a qualification to the
rule enunciated, not contained in the case or in the opinion of the
court. This misapprehension undoubtedly led Mr. Justice Beardsley
into the qualification of the rule otherwise correctly enunciated by
him, and which rule was fully sustained by the authorities cited;
but they do not sustain the qualification of the rule, it being only
found in this head-note. The case in 9th Wheaton was decided in
1824, and I think the rule then laid down was in harmony with
previous adjudications in England and in this country, and, as it
establishes a uniform and reasonable and certain rule of commercial
law by the highest tribunal in the country, and one not in conflict
with our own decisions, I think we ought to recognise and adhere
to it. This rule is approved by one of our most learned and able
writers on this subject. See Edwards on Bills, pp. 485, 486.
I have been able to find but one case where a different rule has
24
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been announced. It is that of Whieelervs. Field, 6 Met. 290. There
the court held, to charge an indorser upon a note dated in New
York, where the maker had removed out of the State where it was
made and dated before its maturity, that a demand should have
been made at the maker's last place of residence in New York,
when he had removed to the State of Illinois. No authorities are
cited for the opinion expressed, and no reasons are .given why it
should be recognised. It is certainly in direct conflict with those
which have been already referred to, and is not in harmony with the
principles settled in numerous cases. We think it better to adhere
to the long-settled rule as laid down in the case in 9th Wheaton,
even although cases might be supposed in wich its application
might, by possibility, work some wrong. It is of the highest importance in a commercial community, that ihe rules relating to the presentment, demand, and protest of bills and notes, should be certain,
and when once enunciated should be adhered to; and no reasons
are suggested which we think should influence us to depart from or
modify the rule as laid down by the United States Supreme Court
in the case in 9th Wheaton. We think it a reasonable, just, and
proper rule, and one which should have universal application.
The judgment appealed from should be affirmed, with costs.
It is much to be regretted that the
rule applicable to an important point of
mercantile law should be different in two
States of such commercial importance as
New York and Massachusetts. The opinion in the principal case shows that
the weight of authority is in favor of
the New York rule. The question may
also be examined from another point of
view.
A test by which the liability of an indorser may be ascertained, is the application of legal principles belonging to
conditional contracts. Certain acts in
the nature of conditions precedent, must
be performed by the holder before the
indorser can be regarded as liable.
These conditions may be either express
or implied. The general principles are
in both cases the same.

I. Express conditions. Themostcommon express condition arises when the
note is made payable at a particular
place. In England, it is the rule that
such a condition forms part of the contract both with the maker and indorser,
and no action can be brought against
either, unless the condition is performed
or dispensed with. In this country generally, the engagement of the maker
under such circumstances is not conditional but absolute, and the failure of the
holder to make the presentment can only
be urged as matter of defence. The indorser may however insist that the clause
forms an essential part of his contract,
and that a demand should be made at
the place named, in order that he may
be charged. It is evident that the material point in this condition is locality
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It is unimportant where the maker may
reside. The parties have chosen by an
explicit statement to contract, that
though the maker may remove from the
country or may abscond, the demand
must be made at the place specified. It
was upon this ground that Sands vs.
Clark, 8 C. B. 751, was decided. An
action was brought against the maker of
a note payable at a particular place.
No presentment had been made, and the
excuse was offered that the maker had
absconded. But as locality was the substance of the condition, the court held
that it had not been performed, and the
maker was not liable. The case was
argued both by counsel and the court
upon the law of conditions, and upon
commercial decisions. Maine's case, 5
Coke R. 25 a, among others was cited.
It was evidently the opinion of the court
that the condition precedent in the case
of negotiable paper would be dispensed
with under the same circumstances as in
other branches of the law. What would
constitute a dispensation as to the maker
would also as to the indorser. This was
suggested by counsel, and denied by no
one. It is evident, under the English
law, the condition so far as it is expressed is the same in both cases.
II. It is true that there is a difference
in one respect between express and implied conditions. The latter cannot affect
the contract of the maker, but only of
the endorser. In the absence of an express condition, the engagement of the
maker is absolute. There is an entire
accord between the commercial law of
England and of this country in this respect. Implied conditions must, however, when they exist, be observed with
the same accuracy as express conditions,
and parol evidence can no more vary the
one than the other. Suse vs. Pompe, 8
C. B. N. S. 537, (1860), Byles, J., delivering the opinion of the court.

What then are the circumstances under
which the condition in question in the
law of negotiable paper is waived? The
indorser stipulates that certain acts in
reference to the maker shall be done by
the holder before he is liable, but he engages on his part that the maker shall
remain in a condition to have those acts
done. If the entire contract were written, it would be somewhat as follows:
"it is understood that if the holder of
the note shall, upon the day on which
by the rules of commercial law it falls
due, present it at the place of business
or of the residence of the maker for payment, and if this is refused, shall give
timely notice to the endorser, he will be
liable. The endorser on his part agrees
that the maker shall do no act to prevent
the demand from being made in the
manner agreed upon." This is the fair
and reasonable construction of the contract. It is manifestly the engagement
by the English law when the maker expressly stipulates for demand at a particular place, and no suggestion has ever
been made in the English courts that
the indorser's contract is in that case
different from the maker's upon the subject of demand. There is, of course,
no legal rule"which would prevent the
indorser from entering into an undertaking as to the conduct of the maker.
The circumstances dispensing with the
performance of a condition precedent
are thus stated by Addison. "Whenever a party by doing a previous act
would acquire a right to any debt or
duty, and the other prevents him from
doing it, he acquires the right as completely as if it had been actually done,"
p. 889, and cases cited. The only inquiry thenis, has the maker prevented
the holder from performing the condition
precedent? This is, for the purpose of
charging the indorser that the note shall
be demanded of the maker at his place

